Urban Battlegrounds: Non-Violent Resistance in Occupied Cities
“I’m thinking again about the recent detentions of activists. In my personal situation, the main drawback and threat is the street surveillance camera, but the advantage is that very few people, or probably no one at all, would see a girl as a partisan by default. It’s convenient to be a Mavka!”
This reflection was shared anonymously to the online journal ‘Zla Mavka’ (Angry Mavka) capturing the daily experiences of women living under occupation1. ‘Zla Mavka’ is an inspiring women’s movement that originated in occupied Melitopol, employing non-violent methods of civic resistance. They design and place clever posters and flyers around the city, distribute newsletters free from Russian propaganda, and share videos of Russian tricolor flags being burned on social media.
Another notable example of civic resistance in Ukraine is the ‘Yellow Ribbon’ movement, honored with the 2023 Sakharov Prize. The movement originated in Kherson after open street protests became impossible due to the occupation regime’s terror. Witnessing their city covered with Russian propaganda banners like “Russia is here forever,” and the militarist ‘Z’ symbol, activists initiated their first act of spreading 100 yellow ribbons throughout the city. This action declared that, even without the ability to protest openly, resistance was alive and Russia was not welcome.
Recognizing the challenges of printing posters or tying ribbons, they came up with a clever campaign. They promoted the idea of transforming the ‘Z’ symbol, which covered all possible surfaces in the city, into a blue-and-yellow hourglass. This symbolized that time was running out for the occupation regime and that de-occupation was imminent3.
When reading about life under occupation, it becomes clear why these simple acts of resistance are so crucial for those living there. In occupied territories, censorship, surveillance, political oppression, repression of free speech, and movement restrictions have created a ‘climate of fear’5. Shortly after the occupation began, internet traffic was rerouted through Russian providers, and Ukrainian mobile infrastructure was co-opted with Russian phone numbers and SIM cards being introduced. Russian authorities pressured residents to obtain Russian citizenship and passports. Additionally, ‘torture chambers’ were established in every city, making residents acutely aware of the risks of arbitrary detention and torture. This system of repression was reinforced by comprehensive surveillance. Street cameras were repurposed to monitor and identify potential resistance among locals, and their numbers increased significantly over time. In this environment, even the smallest acts of resistance become powerful symbols of defiance and hope.
The military occupation represents a violent intrusion into an established spatial world. As a consequence, old and new spatial realities collide, turning the city landscape into a canvas for these contested spatial realities. By covering the city with Russian propaganda and the ‘Z’ symbol, occupiers attempted to assert their control, believing no one would dare to resist. In occupied Mariupol, amid the ruins of a lifeless city, the first thing Russians brought were large portable screens to spread propaganda, forcing locals to feel abandoned, cut off from the outside world, and trapped in the limbo of occupation.
Drawing a sand clock over the ‘Z’ symbol is essentially an attempt to reclaim the city. It reminds others under occupation that there is still hope and that people continue to risk their lives in resistance. Nonviolent actions like this keep the spirit of resistance and morale alive while minimizing the danger for activists due to increased repression in occupied areas. They also serve as a reminder to the Russian occupiers that they are being watched, and that eventually they will be held accountable for crimes committed here.
Both ‘Zla Mavka’ and ‘Yellow Ribbon’ began as small resistance groups in Southern Ukrainian cities during the first month after the full-scale invasion in 2022. They have since spread to other occupied cities, including Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk, which have been under occupation since 2014. According to the leader of the Yellow Ribbon Movement, people joining the movement, especially from long-term occupied territories, are seeking community and inspiration. The case of Kherson, a city that resisted and is now liberated, serves as a powerful example and source of hope for those living under occupation.
The Role of New Technologies
The way resistance operates in occupied territories today wasn’t even possible when the war in Ukraine began in 2014. Mediatization helped the resistance groups survive and grow in their home cities as well as expand to other occupied territories. The Yellow Ribbon, for example, operates entirely online, using Telegram to connect members without revealing their identities. Participants communicate through two Telegram chatbots6: ‘Razom’ (Together) and ‘Ochi’ (Eyes). Using ‘Ochi,’ anyone can anonymously report war crimes in occupied territories. ‘Rasom’ provides a list of possible resistance actions and step-by-step instructions for completing them safely. After completing a mission, such as tying a yellow ribbon and taking a photo, members send the images to the chatbot. Coordinators behind the chatbot then share this footage in the movement’s public Telegram group, which currently has over 18,000 subscribers. This system allows for coordinated action while protecting members’ anonymity.
As anonymity and security are highly prioritized, these groups often operate through paid VPN messengers. ‘Yellow ribbon’ instructs new members how to download ‘П-Telegram’, developed by Belarussian partisans, a modified version of Telegram that covers tracks in dangerous situations by hiding chats, deleting photos, clearing the cache, and more. Due to the secrecy of the movement, mediatization has made it possible to gather and disseminate vital information without direct contact. This means that if resistance members are captured and taken to the ‘torture chamber’ for interrogation, they cannot uncover other members.
Unsurprisingly, the Russian occupying authorities have been actively removing flyers and destroying evidence of resistance group activities in the city. Their goal is to erase any visual signs that the city is a contested space, insisting their presence is settled. But it doesn’t matter if a yellow ribbon is tied for a week or just five minutes before being removed; the documentation of this act of bravery is shared through social media with those who need it most, giving them hope and strength to endure under occupation.
Collaborative mapping of surveillance cameras
The biggest challenge for any resistance movement operating in an urban environment is surveillance cameras. Instructions before operations include recommendations on avoiding arrest, quickly changing clothes, hiding faces, and identifying safe streets away from patrols. But most importantly, activists share up-to-date information about surveillance cameras.
After seizing control of southern Ukrainian cities in 2022, the occupiers took over the existing video surveillance network, initially installed by Ukrainian municipal authorities, and added extra cameras. The occupiers use this system to monitor resistance activities and pro-Ukrainian residents. The surveillance infrastructure that was once intended to protect the city’s inhabitants is now being used as a tool of oppression against them.
In response, ‘Yellow Ribbon‘ activists released a map highlighting the cameras used by Russian occupiers in these regions. This user-generated map on Google Maps was created to enhance the safety of activists. They ask active members to report any additional cameras installed around the city through their chatbot ‘Razom’ (‘together‘), allowing the map to be updated continuously by the community.
This collaborative mapping aims to safeguard the activities of the resistance group by allowing members to contribute to the spatial knowledge of the city, which is then shared among other members. Knowing the locations of surveillance cameras helps resistance members reclaim control over the city, enabling community members to move around more safely. This effort creates opportunities in space, identifying blind spots and ‘space corridors’ free from surveillance, thereby opening areas where resistance can be expressed and providing safe escape routes within the city.
It’s fair to say that Russian-occupied authorities are highly interested in obtaining updated information about the map of surveillance cameras used by the resistance. However, as stated in a Telegram post by ‘Yellow Ribbon,’ this information is only accessible to verified users who have completed their first mission8. To protect the information, Yellow Ribbon has established 20 levels of security, each corresponding to a specific mission, ensuring they are not dealing with undercover Russian federal security officers.
Entrenched occupation
The longer territories remain under occupation, the less favorable the situation becomes for the resistance movement. In areas under prolonged occupation, resistance tends to diminish as people with pro-Ukrainian positions either flee or face repression, leading to a more entrenched occupation regime that increasingly justifies its presence. A member of the ‘Zla Mavka,’ in a recent interview, described the changed regime in the city:
“The occupiers began tapping phones, surveillance cameras appeared on every pole, and an informant system was developed in the city. Lifelong acquaintances now avoid talking about anything significant because someone might have been bribed or threatened. If someone is detained, no one discusses it until they are out of the occupied zone. You might say an extra word on the street, and the next day, they will come for you.”9
Given the vast number of surveillance cameras on the streets and even on roads between occupied cities, activists are always seeking creative means to pursue their goals. After introducing rubles in occupied territories, both ‘Yellow Ribbon’ and ‘Zla Mavka’ leveraged this change to their advantage. ‘Zla Mavka’ introduced fake ruble banknotes with messages like “You are in Ukraine” and “This is not Russia,” leaving them around the city so that anyone who picked them up would receive the message. ‘Yellow Ribbon’ went further, marking actual banknotes with yellow ribbons and hourglasses. They used the mobility of these banknotes to spread their message throughout the occupied territories. These banknotes circulate in Simferopol, Sevastopol, Melitopol, Donetsk, and Luhansk, and as they hold monetary value, people are unlikely to discard them. Since it’s impossible to verify who drew the yellow ribbon or wrote the pro-Ukrainian message, this method of resistance is considered one of the safest and allows for large-scale engagement.
Final thoughts
It’s remarkable how non-violent resistance persists in urban spaces despite growing oppression. In the first week of the full-scale invasion, people took to the streets to protest. Neighbors mobilized, attempting to block the movement of Russian tanks with their bare hands11. After the resistance was violently pushed off the streets, it reappeared through graffiti, ribbons, and posters that covered the city as a canvas. When surveillance cameras were installed on every corner, pushing the resistance off the streets again, time and terror didn’t kill it. The resistance now traverses urban space in an endless flow of banknotes from one hand to another, offering hope to those in need. In the face of oppression, mediatization and digitalization have illuminated a path for this resilient, anonymous community to not only survive but thrive in the urban battlegrounds.
Author biography: Iryna Kuptsova (Ignatieva), a visiting researcher at TU and the CRC 1265 ‘Re-Figuration of Spaces’, studies locative media in wartime. She is an Associate Professor of Sociology from Ukraine, specializing in Urban Sociology, Visual Sociology, and Science and Technology Studies (STS).
Disclaimer: To protect the privacy of people involved in the resistance against the ongoing war, we have chosen not to attempt to identify image copyright holders by name.
References
[1] Зла Мавка. (n.d.). Щоденники мавок в окупації [Mavkas’ Diaries in Occupation]. https://zlamavka.com/category/shhodennyky/. Accessed: July 2024.
[2] Retrieved from ‘Zla Mavka’ official site https://zlamavka.com/en/i-dont-want-flowers-i-want-my-ukraine/
[3] Чорна, О. (2023). Як діє підпільний рух спротиву «Жовта стрічка» на окупованих територіях [How the underground resistance movement ‘Yellow Ribbon’ operates in occupied territories]. Detector Media. https://cs.detector.media/community/texts/185354/2023-04-17-yak-diie-pidpilnyy-rukh-sprotyvu-zhovta-strichka-na-okupovanykh-terytoriyakh/. Accessed: July, 2024.
[4] a) on the left: Retrieved from ‘Yellow ribbon’ Telegram group t.me/yellowribbon_ua/4349 Published April 19, 2023
b) on the right: Retrieved from ‘Yellow ribbon’ Telegram group t.me/yellowribbon_ua/4188 Published April 6, 2023. Author @bright_arts (Yaroslava Yatsuba)
[5] UN Human Rights Office. (2024). UN report details ‘climate of fear’ in occupied areas of Ukraine, as the Russian Federation moves to cement control.https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/03/un-report-details-climate-fear-occupied-areas-ukraine-russian-federation. Accessed: July, 2024.
[6] A computer program that uses artificial intelligence (AI) to communicate with humans through messaging apps, such as Telegram
[7] Retrieved from ‘Yellow ribbon’ facebook https://www.facebook.com/share/p/zNPP3EVGMSWpS1Ld/ Published May 5, 2023
[8] Telegram. (May 3, 2023). Yellow Ribbon Ukraine [Telegram channel]. https://t.me/s/yellowribbon_ua. Accessed: July, 2024.
[9] Александр, К. (2024). ‘Мы здесь и мы продолжаем бороться’ [We are here and we continue to fight]. Important stories. https://istories.media/stories/2024/03/27/mi-zdes-i-mi-prodolzhaem-borotsya/. Accessed: July, 2024.
[10] On the left: Retrieved from ‘Yellow ribbon’ Telegram t.me/yellowribbon_ua/4230. Published April 10, 2023
On the right: Retrieved from ‘Zla Mavka’ Telegram t.me/zlaya_mavka/2224. Published March 16, 2024.
[11] Eastham, J. (2022). ‘Together we are strong’: Ukrainian civilians stop Russian tank from entering Kyiv. The Telegraph. Retrieved July 11, 2024, from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/02/27/together-strong-ukrainian-civilians-stop-russian-tank-entering/. Accessed: July, 2024.